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LAW NOTES
CONSTRUCTIVE ADVERSE POSSESSION UNDER
COLOR OF TITLE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
As used in treating of adverse possession, "color of title" is
an instrument or a record which appears to convey title but
which in fact does not have that effect." Though the doctrine
of color of title seems to be a product of American jurispru-
dence,2 there is a doctrine of evidence applicable to prescrip-
tive possession and somewhat similar to the doctrine of color
of title which has been fully developed in England.3 This
doctrine will be discussed later. While accepting the authority
relative to an American origin, the writer has found no ac-
ceptable authority as to when and where the idea denoted
by the phrase "color of title" was first utilized in the sub-
stantive law of real property. As early as 1824 Judge Hender-
son, a member of a highly respected court, in discussing
adverse possession said:
Color of title, as applicable to the present subject is evi-
dently the production of our own country. I will not
therefore go abroad for an explanation; the name, I pre-
sume, is taken from that which is called giving colour in
pleading, which is never used in this state, and not often,
I believe, in England. * * * Giving colour in pleading,
is giving to your adversary a title which is defective,
but not obviously so, that it would be apparent to one not
skilled in the law; it must be such as would perplex a
layman; it, therefore, draws the consideration of the
question from the jury (the lay gents) to the court,
which is the object of the pleading.4
Even earlier the rule was acknowledged and applied in Ver-
mont,5 and, in 1818, in the case of Read v. Eifert,6 our Court
construed an old statute7 in holding that possession of a part
under color of title give possession of the whole.
1. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, p. 785 (1st ed. 1952).
2. Philbin v. Carr, 75 Ind. App. 560, 129 N. E. 19 (1920); Tate v.
Southard, 3 Hawks 119 (N. C. 1824).
3. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 378 (3rd ed .1940).
4. Tate v. Southard, 3 Hawks 119 (N. C. 1824).
5. Pearsal v. Thorp, 1 D. Chip 92 (Vt. 1797).
6. I Nott & McCord 374 (S. C. 1818).
7. Apparently passed in 1712 according to a statement in King v.
Smith, Rice 10 (S. C. 1838), to the effect that Read v. Eifert was de-
cided with reference to such a statute.
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Despite the fact that a statute was the basis for the definite
adoption of the rule in South Carolina, the Court placed more
emphasis on practical considerations. Reference was made to
the fact that few lawyers resided in the back country, and that
consequently many deeds were defective. The Court also
pointed out at some length the confusion which had resulted
prior to the adoption of a definite standard as to the extent
of possession under color of title. The decision in the case
set at rest a controversy of approximately twenty years
standing on the merits of the proposition that an adverse
possessor under color of title should be given constructive
possession to the limits of the tract described in his deed."
But what is the significance of the phrase "color of title"?
In the leading case of Philbin v. Carr,9 the Appellate Court of
Indiana, speaking through Justice Dausman, said:
Literally, of course, it signifies that which resembles
title, has the appearance of title, looks like title, purports
to be title; but in fact is not title. Obviously that is its
general meaning.
And Justice Cheves, speaking for the Constitutional Court of
South Carolina in the year 1817, said:
I understand, by colour of title any written muniment,
purporting to vest title in the person claiming. I say
written, for although I think a descent, cast, and the like,
will equally, in an abstract sense, constitute color of
title, it is not used, in this sense, by those who introduce
it.1o
Color of title in South Carolina has known a common law
and a statutory existence. This note will be devoted to an
8. After reviewing the cases on the subject in South Carolina, and
referring, incidentally, to the fact that no information was to be had
prior to 1793, and pointing out that much confusion had resulted from
the waivering attitude of the court on the point, the court said, in
reference to the previous rule that the extent of possession was to be left
to the jury, that: "This was not the only defect. Another still more
insurmountable difficulty occurred under this rule. It was this; when
the jury found one, two, three or four fold of wood land, neither they
or anybody else, concerned in the case, knew where to locate it. They
had no such power. They could not say, it shall be placed on the north
or south, east or west of the cultivated land. Nor had the judge, who
presided over the case, any such power. And the surveyors would be
entirely premature if they should attempt to fix the boundaries before
the trial; because they could never tell whom the Jury would find their
verdict for, nor could they possibly devine how much woodland, or on
what side the Jury would find it."
9. See Note 2 supra.
10. Williams v. McGee, 1 Mill's Const. 85 (S. C. 1817).
[Vol. 10
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examination of the cases, both before and after the legislative
enactments" relating to the doctrine, with a view in mind of
determining its present status. Special consideration will be
given to the two main elements of the rule: What is necessary
to constitute color of title, and the extent of possession under
color of title.
THE STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
In determining the status of the South Carolina doctrine,
the first question to be considered is the requirement of a
writing as color of title. The majority of states require, aside
from any question as to the kind of writing, that there be a
writing describing the boundaries before color of title can
be claimed.'1 A few cases hold that color of title may exist
under a parol gift or sale.' 3 Most authorities agree that the
reason for the minority holding is the failure of the courts
to distinguish between "claim of title" and "color of title".
Claim of title means nothing more than the person entering
into possession must enter with the intention of claiming the
land as his own in order to constitute his possession adverse. 14
Color of title is not an element of adverse possession, but is
supplemental to it, extending the possession. 5
Though the doctrine of color of title has not been adopted
in England, a doctrine of evidence applicable to prescriptive
possession has been fully developed.'0 Under the English doc-
tine possession of a whole tract of land may be inferred from
specific instances of possession of parts of it, the idea being
that the separate instances of conduct in relation to the land
indicate a larger and habitual course of conduct. "The con-
ditions of admissibility are that the various acts should be
so connected with each other, as to the topography of the
place where they are done, that they suggest a system or
course of conduct with reference to other parts of the ad-
jacent land; i. e., that the various places where the acts are
shown should be parts of one estate, manor, way, range, sec-
11. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-2422 - 10-2425.
12. Walker v. Oswald, 156 S. C. 424, 153 S. E. 286 (1930) ; Roe v. Doe
ex. dem. Tenn. Coal, Iron & Ry. Co., 162 Ala. 151, 50 So. 230 (1909);
Barrett v. Brewer, 153 N. C. 547, 69 S. E. 614 (1910).
13. Simmons v. Parsons, 2 Hill 492 (S. C. 1829), note; Sumner v.
Murphy, 2 Hill 488 (S. C. 1834).
14. Carr v. Mouzon, 86 S. C. 461, 68 S. E. 661 (1910).
15. Fore v. Berry, 94 S. C. 71, 78 S. E. 706 (1913).
16. Stanley v. White, 14 East 332, 104 Eng. Rep. 630 (K. B. 1811);
Barnes v. Mawson, 1 M. & S. 78, 105 Eng. Rep. 30 (K. B. 1813).
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tion, survey, or other entity, so that the acts done upon these
would naturally be done only as a part of a system to do them,
upon the other parts of the same entity. * * * Where the pos-
session of the part is under a deed which covers a larger tract,
the principle is the same,17 but here the inference is stronger,
because the deed, by marking the singleness of the entire
tract, supplies the place of other evidence or unity of char-
acter", 8 Thus we find that in England, under a doctrine
somewhat similar to the doctrine of color of title, a writing
is not necessary to extend possession, but that the conduct
of the claimant may give rise to an inference that land con-
structively possessed was actually possessed.
In Williams v. McGee,19 decided shortly after Read v.
Eifert,20 the Court recognized that the latter case had settled
the point that naked possession will give title and the point
that actual possession of a part will, under certain evidence
of claim, be considered a legal possession of the whole quan-
tity claimed. In facing the problem of what evidence would
be sufficient to extend the possession, the Court recognized
the general requirement of a writing as color of title, but
determined that a writing would not be necessary if the
claimant should introduce other sufficient evidence. The fol-
lowing rules were suggested for the consideration of the Court
when again faced with the problem:
1. That in all cases, the extent of the claim ought to
be established unequivocally, and ought to have been
uniform for the period required by the act to give title.
2. That naked possession should carry with it only the
spot occupied, (an extreme case may occur, but it should
be treated as an exception,) and superadded inclosures.
3. That actual possession of a part, under an unequivocal
reference to a colourable title in writing, (defining this
title as already mentioned,) or a survey made by public
authority, should establish a legal possession co-exten-
sive with the claim of title. 4. That actual possession of
a part of a tract of land, well defined by use, or obvious
and well known boundaries, shall be co-extensive, with
the limits of such boundaries. 21
17. Lancy v. Brock, 110 Ill. 609 (1884).
18. 2 WIGMIORE, EVIDENCE § 378 (3rd ed. 1940).
19. Williams v. McGee, 1 Mill's Const. 85 (S. C. 1817).
20. Read v. Eifert, 1 Nott & McCord 374 (S. C. 1818).
21. See Note 19 supra, at page 97.
282 [Vol. 10
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Cogitation upon the above stated rules leads the writer to
conclude that the Court, or at least one member thereof, felt
that the doctrine of color of title was not an exclusive means
of extending actual possession to include that constructively
possessed, but that sufficient evidence other than a writing
would also perform the same service.
In connection with the above stated conclusion, the case of
Turpin v. Brannon22 might be considered. Though the actual
holding of the Court was that a plat of resurvey was admis-
sible to show the extent of the defendant's claim, the Court
again viewed the problem as one of evidence, and indicated,
by way of dicta, that a writing would not be necessary for
constructive possession to be deemed actual possession.
In 2 Hill's Law Reports appear three interesting cases
wherein the facts warranted a consideration of the doctrine
of color of title. In the case of Simmons v. Parsons,23 the
plaintiff relied upon the adverse possession of one Littleton
Parsons under a parol contract of purchase to establish his
title. The Supreme Court affirmed the following charge of
the trial judge:
Color of title I defined to be anything which shows
the extent of the occupant's claim. I told them that
an equitable title, such as a bond, a receipt, or a written
contract of purchase, and finally, a parol contract of
purchase, with well defined and known limits and boun-
daries, would be color of title, and coupled with five years
adverse possession would confer a good title in law of
granted lands. (Emphasis added.)
Though the trial judge charged that a parol contract of pur-
chase would be color of title, he did not charge that such
parol contract, nothing else appearing, would be color of title.
Its application was limited to the extent that the limits and
boundaries of the tract in question be known and well de-
fined.
The decision in the Simmons case was the basis for the
holding in Sumner v. Murphy.2 4 In an action by a son of
Mill Sumner where the defendant relied on the possession of
another son under a parol gift to establish his claim, the
following portion of the Court's opinion is significant:
22. 3 McCord 261 (S. C. 1825).
23. Simmons v. Parsons, 2 Hill 492 (S. C. 1829), note; Sumner v.
Murphy, 2 Hill 488 (S. C. 1834).
24. Ibid.
1958]
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This is giving to the parol gift its true effect. It does
not operate as title per se; but it gives a character to
the possession, and operates as a color of title to show how
far the actual possession should have constructive ef-
fect.
While the opinion does not reveal what evidence, other than
the parol gift, the defendant relied on to show the extent of
his claim, the writer can only surmise that he did, in fact,
rely upon other evidence. Otherwise, it seems that it would
have been impossible for the defendant to establish the ex-
tent of his claim.
In the case of M'Elwee v. Martin,25 decided during the same
term, the Court was again faced with the problem of whether
a parol gift would operate as color of title. The Court al-
lowed the gift to so operate, but limited that operation to the
extent that the limits of the gift should be well defined.
Another early case involving the parol gift problem might
be mentioned. In Golson v. Hook,20 the Court refused to
allow a parol gift, nothing else appearing, to constitute color
of title. Once more, the Court recognized the problem to
be one of evidence.
While the holding of the foregoing case seems to be in
conflict with the holding of Sumner v. Murphy27 the cases
have been distinguished.28 1 Where the view prevails that a
written instrument is essential to confer color of title, a dis-
tinction is made as to whether the claim of color of title is
set up against the donor or persons in privity with him, or
against persons not in privity. Where a donee claims against
a person not in privity with the donor, as in Golson v. Hook,29
the gift is not sufficient to constitute color of title. In the
Sumner case, where annotators3 0 have found privity to exist
between the person against whom adverse possession was
25. 2 Hill 496 (S. C. 1834).
26. 4 Strob. 23 (S. C. 1849).
27. See Note 23 supra.
28. See Nicholson, Adverse Possession - Effect of Possession Held
Under a Parol Gift, 4 S. 0. L. Q. 320, 322 (1951).
29. Golson v. Hook, 4 Strob. 23 (S. 0. 1849).
30. 2 A. L. R. 1457, 1466 (1919). The writer would differ with the
opinion of the annotators as Sumner v. Murphy did not involve a con-
troversy between a donee and a donor or one in privity with him, but a
controversy between a devisee of one Mil Sumner and a defendant who
had succeeded to the estate of the donee of Mil Sumner. To find privity
between the plaintiff and defendant in this case seems to stretch the
concept of privity applicable to the parol gift situation.
284 [Vol. 10
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claimed and the donor, the Court allowed the parol gift to
operate as color of title. It is significant to note that the
Court did not mention this distinction in either case, and
the presence or absence of privity was not alluded to by the
Court in either opinion.
In 1870, there were enacted in this State certain statutes
31
which require any claim constituting color of title to be in
writing. Three cases32 decided subsequent to that year have
adopted the definition of color of title announced in Simmons
v. Parsons,33 thereby indicating that, notwithstanding the
aforementioned statutes, a writing is not necessary for color
of title. Two observations might be made concerning these
cases. First, in each case a writing was present; and, sec-
ond, no mention was made of the statutory provisions bearing
on the subject.
Several cases34 involving a consideration of these statutes
indicate that a writing is necessary for color of title. Prob-
ably the most interesting of these cases is Haithcock v. Haith-
cock. 35 In a portion of his charge to the jury in an action
for recovery of real estate, the trial judge stated that a parol
gift is not color of title and that color of title means a writ-
ing. In an earlier portion of his charge, however, the judge
stated that if one in possession of a part of a tract of land
marked out and fenced the tract, he would be in possession
under color of title. In the words of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court, "His Honor charged the law applicable to the
case, clearly and correctly * * * ." The reference to the con-
flicting statements made by the trial judge is not without pur-
pose. It serve to illustrate a point which the writer would
convey - that the definitions of color of title which may
be found in the South Carolina cases are of negligible prac-
tical value.
In the writer's opinion, to view the problem from the stand-
point of evidence as well as the standpoint of color of title is
to view the problem properly. If sufficient evidence other
31. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-2422 - 10-2425.
32. Duren v. Strait, 16 S. C. 465 (1881); Stanley v. Shoolbred, 25
S. C. 181 (1886); Heyward v. Farmer's Mining Company, 42 S. C. 138,
19 S. E. 963 (1894) ; reh. den. 42 S. C. 138, 20 S. E. 64 (1894).
33. Simmons v. Parsons, 2 Hill 492 (S. C. 1829), note; Sumner v.
Murphy, 2 Hill 488 (S. C. 1834).
34. Haithcock v. Haithcock, 123 S. C. 61, 115 S. E. 727 (1922); Lyles
v. Fellers, 138 S. C. 31, 136 S. E. 13 (1926); Walker v. Oswald, 156
S. C. 424, 153 S. E. 286 (1930).
35. Ibid.
1958]
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than written evidence be introduced to show the extent of
the claim, then the necessity for a writing disappears. As
the amount of other evidence decreases the necessity for writ-
ten evidence (color of title) increases. In conclusion, though
the present status of the doctrine of color of title cannot be
clearly determined from an examination of the cases, the
writer feels that future problems may be obviated by a
proper analysis of the situation.
WHAT INSTRUMENTS WILL SUFFICE
When a party claims title to land by adverse possession and
introduces a writing in support of his claim, the question of
the sufficiency of the writing to operate as color of title
arises. Under Section 10-2422 of the 1952 Code, it is clear
that color of title may consist only of a written instrument as
being a conveyance of the premises in question, or a decree
or judgment of a court.30 In applying the above stated statute,
the Court concluded that the words "as being a conveyance
of the premises" show that the extent of the occupant's claim,
founded on an instrument of writing, is not dependent upon
the validity of such instrument.37 Accordingly, a quit claim
deed was held to be color of title although the grantor was
without interest in the land conveyed. 38 However, a deed
made with the intent to defraud creditors was held not to
constitute color of title in the case of Garvin v. Garvin.3 9
The Court therein adopted the rule40 that the claim of color
of title must be prima facie valid, or what purports to be
valid.
Should a party find that his deed is defective, the possi-
bility exists that he may relinquish his claim under the deed
as a conveyance and seize upon the statute of limitations as
a panacea, relying on the deed as color of title. Thus in the
case of Lyles v. Kirkpatrick,41 the Court held that possession
for ten years under a deed deficient in point of proof for
want of two subscribing witnesses cured the defect. Simi-
larly, the statute may be relied upon to cure the defect arising
36. Lyles v. Fellers, 138 S. C. 31, 136 S. E. 13 (1926).
37. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 86 S. C. 483, 68 S. E. 664 (1910).
38. Graniteville Co. v. Williams, 209 S. C. 112, 39 S. E. 2d 202 (1946).
39. 40 S. C. 435, 19 S. E. 79 (1894).
40. TYLER, EJECTTENT, p. 870 (1st ed. 1876).
41. 9 S. C. 265 (1877).
[Vol. 10
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from the omission of words of inheritance in deeds.42 Further,
an early South Carolina case43 is a holding to the effect that
an unregistered deed will operate as color of title and sup-
port a claim of adverse possession, thereby defeating the
claim of a party holding under a subsequent recorded deed.
As the only office of color of title is to define the extent
of the claim beyond the actual occupancy to the whole prop-
erty described in the writing, it is not necessary that the
writing should be in the form of a deed.44 Other instruments
held to be color of title in this State are: (1) an award of
arbitrators, though ineffectual to pass title to land,45 (2) a
master's deed in partition, even though the proceedings were
irregular,4 6 (3) a will of a foreign state executed before two
witnesses only an therefore insufficient to pass title to land,47
(4) a mortgage,48 and (5) a plat.49 There exist, of course,
other possibilities and the above list is not intended to be
exclusive.
Suppose that the writing relied upon for color of title can-
not be produced by the adverse claimant. Under such cir-
cumstances, the trial judge may in his discretion admit sec-
ondary evidence of its contents and thereby enable him to
show the extent of his claim. 6 The writing, however, must
have been in the possession of the claimant or of those under
whom he held at sometime prior to the commencement of
the action.51
It is well settled that the instrument under which a party
holds adversely by color of title must define the extent of the
claim.52 But the mere fact that a mistake has been made
in describing the land is not fatal. In Fore v. Berry,53 the
Court held that a description, although indefinite, is suffi-
cient if the Court can, with the aid of extrinsic evidence which
does not add to, enlarge, or in any way change the description
fit it to the property conveyed by the deed. Accordingly, the
42. Carolina Sav. Bank v. McMahon, 37 S. C. 309, 16 S. E. 31 (1892).
See Means, Words of Inheritance in Deeds of Land, 5 S. C. L. Q. 354-357.
43. Gordon's Lessee v. Parson's Ex'rs., 1 Bay 37 (S. C. 1786).
44. Fore v. Berry, 94 S. C. 71, 78 S. E. 706 (1913).
45. Ibid.
46. Weston v. Morgan, 162 S. C. 177, 160 S. E. 436 (1931).
47. Love v. Turner, 78 S. C. 513, 59 S. E. 529 (1907).
48. Frady v. Ivester, 129 S. C. 536, 125 S. E. 134 (1924).
49. Sprott v. Sprott, 114 S. C. 62, 96 S. E. 617 (1918).
50. Congdon v. Morgan, 14 S. C. 587 (1879).
51. Stanley v. Shoolbred, 25 S. C. 181 (1886).
52. Garvin v. Garvin, 40 S. C. 435, 19 S. E. 79 (1894).
53. Fore v. Berry, 94 S. C. 71, 78 S. E. 706 (1913).
1958] 287
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Court therein held that a description as a three hundred acre
tract of land in dispute between Willis Fore and E. B. Berry
on January 4, 1886, was sufficient. Thus all that appears to
be necessary is that there should be such a designation that
the land may be identified by the description. 54 And a long
continued possession appears to have the effect of curing a
deficiency in the description contained in a deed when it is
relied upon as color of title to establish an adverse possessor's
claim.5
EXTENT OF POSSESSION
The difference in the extent of possession to which an ad-
verse claimant is entitled where he claims under a written
instrument as color of title and where his claim is not founded
upon a written instrument is readily discernible from an ex-
amination of the statutory provision relating thereto.56 In
54. Kirkland v. Way, 3 Rich. 4 (S. C. 1846). In the words of the
court: "In order to give effect to a deed it is necessary that it should
contain such a designation of the thing granted that it may be identified
by the description. Land may be described by the name of the owner
or occupant, or by the name of the tract, if, by either, the tract is
well and commonly known; or by boundaries; or by reference to a plat;
or by the number of acres. The certainty of the description depends on
the accuracy with which these terms are applied. By the use of one,
or all of them, the subject must be so described, that it may, with rea-
sonable certainty be identified. The rules defining the certainty neces-
sary in the description in a deed must be few and very general. In
Shepard's Touchstone two are given pertinent to this case. First; where
there is, in the first place a sufficient certainty and demonstration;
and afterwards, an additional term of description, which fails in point
of accuracy, it may be rejected as surplusage; and second, that if the
terms of designation, which are essential to the description, cannot
be satisfied, the grant must fail of effect entirely; or so far as the
terms of the description cannot be satisfied."
55. Gourdin v. Davis, 2 Rich. 481 (S. C. 1846).
56. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-2422 through
10-2425: § 10-2422. Occupation under written instrument, etc. "When-
ever it shall appear (1) that the occupant or those under whom he
claims entered into the possession of premises under claim of title,
exclusive of any other right, founding such claim upon a written instru-
ment as being a conveyance of the premises in question or upon a decree
or judgment of a competent court and (2) that there has been a con-
tinued occupation and possession of the premises, or of some part of
such premises, included in such instrument, decree or judgment under
such claim for ten years the premises so included shall be deemed to have
been held adversely, except that when the premises so included consist
of a tract divided into lots the possession of one lot shall not be deemed
a possession of any other lot of the same tract."
§ 10-2423. What constitutes adverse possession under written instru-
ment, etc. "For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any
person claiming a title founded upon a writen instrument or a judg-
ment or decree, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and occupied
in the following cases:
(1) When it has been usually cultivated or improved;
(2) When it has been protected by a substantial enclosure;
10
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the case of Walker v. Oswald,57 the Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Cothran, said:
Under the Code * * *, there is a marked difference in
the establishment of adverse possession, where the party
setting it up is claiming under a written instrument, and
where he is not.
In the former he shall be deemed to have been possessed
of and occupied the premises: where they have been usu-
ally cultivated or improved; where they have been protect-
ed by a substantial enclosure, or where, though not en-
closed, they have been used for the supply of fuel, or of
fencing timber, or for the purposes of husbandry, or for
the ordinary use of the occupant. In the latter he shall be
deemed to have been possessed in the following cases
only: where the premises have been protected by a sub-
stantial enclosure; or where they have been usually cul-
tivated and improved.
Generally, the courts hold that the constructive possession
allowed the adverse possessor under color of title will ex-
tend only to the boundaries described in the instrument.58
However, the case of Witcover v. Grant50 seems to be an ex-
ception to this rule. This was an action to recover from the
defendant 13.4 acres of land in a 238 acre tract. The Court
held that a deed describing the defendant's holding as 25
acres and a plat describing his holding as 27.5 acres gave
(3) When, although not enclosed, it has been used for the supply of
fuel or of fencing timber, for the purposes of husbandry or for
the ordinary use of the occupant; and
(4) When a known farm or a single lot has been partly improved
the portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not
cleared or not enclosed, according to the usual course and custom
of the adjoining country, shall be deemed to have been occupied
for the same length of time as the part improved and culti-
vated."
§ 10-2424. Premises held adversely but not under written instrument.
"When it shall appear that there has been an actual continued occupa-
tion of premises under a claim of title, exclusive of any other right but
not founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, the
premises so actually occupied, and no other, shall be deemed to have
been held adversely."
§ 10-2425. Adverse possession under claim of title not written. "For
the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming
title not founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree,
land shall be deemed to have been possessed in the following cases only:
(1) When it has been protected by a substantial enclosure; and
(2) When it has been usually cultivated or improved."
57. 156 S. C. 424, 426, 153 S. E. 286 (1930).
58. Johnson v. McMillan, 1 Strob. 143 (S. C. 1846).
59. 93 S. C. 190, 76 S. E. 274 (1911).
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him color of title to the line marked by the surveyor which
gave him 38.4 acres. Here the plaintiff, as holder of the legal
title, was in constructive possession of the land in dispute by
virtue of his actual possession of part of the land. Under
circumstances such as these, the adverse claimant should be
limited to the land actually occupied by him; for such is the
general rule10 and an early South Carolina case6' so holds.
The undisputed evidence was to the effect that the defendant
had used the disputed area for the purposes of husbandry
and the ordinary uses of the occupant. Thus it seems that our
statutory provisions raise a presumption of actual occupancy
under such circumstances and that this presumption cannot
be overcome by a showing of constructive possession in the
owner. The case of Battle v. DeVane 2 is a holding by our
Supreme Court that where land is used for any purpose men-
tioned in Section 10-2423 of the 1952 Code such use will over-
come the constructive possession of the owner under a valid
deed. To allow such acts as using the land for the supply of
fuel or fencing timber to defeat the constructive possession
of the true owner who may be unaware of such acts seems
unconscionable, and therefore these holdings are subject to
criticism.
CONCLUSION
Though there were two writings present in the Witcover
case, supra, the Court awarded the defendant possession of a
larger area than that evidenced by either writing. As the de-
fendant's possession was extended to a line marked by a
surveyor, it appears that a writing as color of title is not
singularly determinative of the extent of the award to be
made the adverse claimant, but that the Court will view all
available evidence in reaching its decision. As it has been
shown that under an English doctrine a writing is not neces-
sary to support constructive possession, the writer feels that
it is not unreasonable to assert that in this State evidence,
other than written, will support constructive possession.
As a result of the statutory enactments and cases relating
thereto, another problem involving the extent of possession
has arisen. These cases, previously discussed, show that the
constructive possession of an adverse claimant may overcome
60. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, p. 820 (1st ed. 1952).
61. MecBeth v. Donnelly, Dud. 177 (S. C. 1838).
62. 140 S. C. 305, 138 S. E. 821 (1927).
[Vol. 10
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the constructive possession of an owner in actual possession
of a portion of his land if the adverse claimant uses the
land in dispute for any of the purposes listed in Section
10-2423 of the 1952 Code.
It is hoped that the Supreme Court will render proper solu-
tions to these problems when they next present themselves.
HARRY R. EASTERLING.
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